



OBJECT-RELATIONSHIP PSYCHOLOGY AS THE RATIONALE OF THE INTERNALIZATION OF OBJECTS

In a previous article (1941) I attempted to formulate a new version of the libido theory and to outline the general features which a systematic psychopathology based upon this re-formulation would appear to assume. The basic conception which I advanced on that occasion, and to which I still adhere, is to the effect that libido is primarily object-seeking (rather than pleasure-seeking, as in the classic theory), and that it is to disturbances in the object-relationships of the developing ego that we must look for the ultimate origin of all psychopathological conditions. This conception seems to me not only to be closer in accord with psychological facts and clinical data than that embodied in Freud's original theory of the libido, but also to represent a logical outcome of the present stage of psycho-analytical thought and a necessary step in the further development of psycho-analytical theory. In particular, it seems to me to constitute an inevitable implication of the illuminating conception of internalized objects, which has been so fruitfully developed by Melanie Klein, but which traces its scientific origin to Freud's theory of the super-ego (an endopsychic structure which was, of course, conceived by him as originating in the internalization of objects).

Quite apart from the considerations advanced in my previous paper or various other considerations which could be adduced, it may be claimed that the psychological introjection of objects and, in particular, the perpetuation of introjected objects in inner reality are processes which by their very nature imply that libido is essentially object-seeking; for the mere presence of oral impulses is in itself quite insufficient to account for such a pronounced devotion to objects as these phenomena imply. A similar implication would appear to arise out of the mere possibility of an Oedipus situation being perpetuated in the unconscious; for unceasing devotion to an object constitutes the very essence of this situation. Nevertheless the conception of internalized objects has been developed without any significant modification of a libido theory with which there is no small reason to think that it is incompatible. Freud himself never saw fit to undertake any systematic re-formulation of his original theory of libido, even after the introduction of his theory of the super-ego. At the same time there are innumerable passages in his works in which it appears to be taken for granted that libido is specifically object-seeking. Indeed it is possible to find passages in which this implicit view becomes explicit—as, for example, when he states quite simply (1929): 'Love seeks for objects.' This statement occurs in a paragraph in which, referring to his original theory of instincts, he writes as follows: 'Thus first arose the contrast between ego instincts and object instincts. For the energy of the latter instincts and exclusively for them I introduced the term libido; an antithesis was then formed between the ego instincts and the libidinal instincts directed towards objects.' As Freud proceeds to point out, the distinction between these two groups of instincts was abandoned upon his 'introduction of the concept of narcissism, i.e. the idea that libido cathects the ego itself; but in the light of the passage quoted it would appear no very revolutionary step to claim that libido is primarily object-seeking, especially if, as I have suggested in my previous article, we conceive of narcissism as a state in which the ego is identified with objects.¹

¹ Quite apart from this suggestion, there is no necessary incompatibility between the view that libido is primarily object-seeking and the conception of libido cathecting the ego, since there is always the possibility of one part of the ego structure treating another part as an object—a possibility which cannot be ignored in the light of what follows regarding the splitting of the ego.

Nevertheless the ever increasing concentration of psycho-analytical research upon object-relationships has left unmodified the original theory that libido is primarily pleasure-seeking, and with it the related conception that 'the course of mental processes is automatically regulated by "the pleasure principle"' (Freud, 1920; 1). The persistence of this view has raised various problems which might otherwise have proved easier of solution. Prominent amongst these is the problem for which Freud set out to find a solution in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) itself, viz. how it comes about that neurotics cling to painful experiences so assiduously. It was the difficulty of accounting for this phenomenon in terms of the pleasure principle that led Freud to fall back upon the conception of a 'repetition compulsion'. If, however, libido is regarded as primarily object-seeking, there is no need to resort to this expedient; and in a recent article (1943) I attempted to show how the tendency to cling to painful experiences may be explained in terms of relationships with bad objects. In the same article I also attempted to show how the difficulties involved in the conception of primary 'death instincts' (in contrast to the conception of primary aggressive instincts) may be avoided if all the implications of libidinal relationships with bad objects are taken into account.

IMPULSE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS LIMITATIONS

In actual fact, the 'object-relationship' standpoint which I have now come to adopt has resulted from an attempt, imposed upon me by circumstances, to gain a better understanding of the problems presented by patients displaying certain schizoid tendencies, i.e. a class of individuals for whom object-relationships present an especial difficulty; and here, in parenthesis, I venture to express the opinion that psycho-analytical research in its later phases has suffered from too great a preoccupation with the problems of melancholia. Previous to my reaching the above mentioned standpoint, however, I had already become very much impressed by the limitations of 'impulse psychology' in general, and somewhat sceptical of the explanatory value of all theories of instinct in which the instincts are treated as existing *per se*. The limitations of impulse psychology make themselves felt in a very practical sense within the therapeutic field; for, whilst to reveal the nature of his 'impulses' to a patient by painstaking analysis is one proposition, to enable him to know what to do with these 'impulses' is quite another. What an individual shall do with his 'impulses' is clearly a problem of object-relationships. It is equally a problem of his own personality; but (constitutional factors apart) problems of the personality are themselves bound up with object-relationships. These problems are bound up with the relationships of the ego to its internalized objects—or, as I should prefer to say for reasons which will shortly appear, the relationships of various *parts* of the ego to internalized objects and to one another as objects. In a word 'impulses' cannot be considered apart from the endopsychic structures which they energize and the object-relationships which they enable these structures to establish; and, equally, 'instincts' cannot profitably be considered as anything more than forms of energy which constitute the dynamic of such endopsychic structures.

From a practical psychotherapeutic standpoint the analysis of impulses considered apart from structures proves itself a singularly sterile procedure, and particularly so in the case of patients with well-marked schizoid tendencies. By means of interpretations couched more or less exclusively in terms of impulses, it is sometimes quite easy in such cases to release a flood of associations (e.g. in the form of oral-sadistic phantasies), which appear singularly impressive as manifestations of the unconscious, but which can be maintained indefinitely without any real movement in the direction of integration and without any significant therapeutic development. The explanation of this phenomenon would appear to be that the ego (or, as I should prefer to say, *the central ego*) does not participate in the phantasies described except as a recording agent. When such a situation arises, the central ego, so to speak, sits back in the dress-circle and describes the dramas enacted upon the stage of inner reality without any effective participation in them. At the same time it derives considerable narcissistic satisfaction from being the recorder of remarkable events and identifying itself with the analyst as observer while asserting a superiority over the analyst as mere observer by reason of the fact that it is not merely observing, but also furnishing the material for observation. This procedure is really a masterpiece of defensive technique—one to which schizoid individuals are only too ready to resort at the best of times, but which constitutes an almost irresistible temptation to them when the analyst's interpretations are couched too exclusively in terms of 'impulses'. Such a technique provides the best of all means of enabling the patient to evade the central therapeutic problem, viz. how to release those dynamic charges known as 'impulses' in the context of reality. This problem is clearly one of object-relationships within the social order.

My point regarding the inadequacy of impulse psychology may be illustrated by a reference to one of the cases in the light of which my present views were developed. This patient was an unmarried woman with schizoid features which were none the less present because the clinical picture was dominated by well-marked phobic and hysterical symptoms, as well as by generalized anxiety. She was repressed in proportion to a high degree of unrelieved libidinal tension. When this

libidinal tension rose during a session, it was no uncommon occurrence for her to complain of feeling sick. This sense of nausea was undoubtedly a transference phenomenon based upon an attitude towards her mother and her mother's breast mediated by her father and her father's penis, all as internalized objects; and it readily lent itself to interpretation in terms of oral impulses in so far as her associations had been characterized from the first by a considerable amount of oral material. Nevertheless the chief significance of her nausea seemed to reside, not so much in the oral nature of the reaction as in the influence shown by this reaction to be exercised upon her object-relationships (1) by a libidinal fixation upon her mother's breast, and (2) by an attitude of rejection towards the object of her libidinal need. It was true, of course, that the oral nature of her reaction was related to a severe repression of genital sexuality; and she was probably right when, on more than one occasion, she hazarded the opinion that she would be frigid in intercourse, although the correctness of this surmise had never been put to the test. At the same time, her difficulty in achieving a genital attitude seemed best understood, not in terms of any fixation at an oral stage, but rather in terms of a rejection of her father's penis based partly on an identification of this object with the bad breast, partly on a preferential fixation on the breast, and partly on the emotional 'badness' of her father as a whole object. The scales were further weighted against a genital attitude by the fact that an oral attitude involves a lesser degree of commitment to the object whilst conferring a greater measure of power over it. It was not uncommon for the same patient to say during a session: 'I want to go the lavatory.' In the first instance this statement had quite a literal significance; but later in the analysis it came increasingly to mean that she was experiencing a desire to express libidinal feelings mobilized by the transference situation. Here again, it was not in the nature of the 'impulse' considered in terms of phases (this time urinary and anal) that the chief significance of the phenomenon lay. It lay rather in the quality of the object-relationship involved. 'Going to the lavatory', like 'being sick', undoubtedly signified a rejection of the libidinal object considered as contents. Nevertheless, as compared with 'being sick', it signified a lesser measure of rejection; for, although in both cases a cathartic discharge of libidinal tension was also involved, the discharge of contents represented by 'going to the lavatory', being a discharge of assimilated contents, indicated a greater willingness to express libidinal feelings *before* an external object, albeit falling short of that direct discharge of feelings *towards* an object, which characterizes the genital attitude.

The scientific validity of a psychological theory cannot, of course, be assessed solely in terms of psychotherapeutic success or failure; for the scientific significance of therapeutic results can only be judged when it is known exactly how these results are obtained. Impulse psychology cannot be regarded as providing any exception to this general rule; but it is significant that, where psycho-analysis is concerned, it is now generally recognized that therapeutic results are closely related to the phenomenon of transference, i.e. to the establishment of an object-relationship of a special kind with the analyst on the part of the patient. On the other hand, it is an accepted article of the psycho-analytical technique that the analyst should be unusually self-effacing. As we know, there are very good reasons for the adoption of such an attitude on his part; but it inevitably has the effect of rendering the object-relationship between patient and analyst somewhat one-sided from the patient's point of view and thus contributing to the resistance. A certain one-sidedness in the relationship between patient and analyst is, of course, inherent in the analytical situation; but it would appear that, when the self-effacing attitude of the analyst is combined with a mode of interpretation based upon a psychology of impulse, a considerable strain is imposed upon the patient's capacity for establishing satisfactory object-relationships (a capacity which must be regarded as already compromised in virtue of the fact that the patient is a patient at all). At the same time, the patient is placed under a considerable temptation to adopt, among other defences, that to which reference has already been made, viz. the technique of describing scenes enacted on the stage of inner reality without any significant participation on the part of the central ego either in these scenes or in an effective object-relationship with the analyst. One of my patients, who was a past master in this technique, said to me one day, after providing a comprehensive intellectual description of the state of impulse-tension in which he felt himself to be placed: 'Well, what are you going to do about it?' By way of reply I explained that the real question was what he himself was going to do about it. This reply proved highly disconcerting to him, as indeed it was intended to be. It was disconcerting to him because it faced him abruptly with the real problem of the analysis and of his life. How an individual is going to dispose of impulse-tension is clearly a problem of object-relationships: but it is equally a problem of the personality, since an object-relationship necessarily involves a subject as well as an object. The theory of object-relationships thus inevitably leads us to the position that, if impulses cannot be considered apart from objects, whether external or internal, it is equally impossible to consider them apart from ego structures. Indeed it is even more impossible to consider impulses apart from ego structures, since it is only ego structures that can seek relationships with objects. We are thus

brought back to the conclusion, already recorded, that 'impulses' are but the dynamic aspect of endopsychic structures and cannot be said to exist in the absence of such structures, however immature these may turn out to be. Ultimately 'impulses' must be simply regarded as constituting the forms of activity in which the life of ego structures consists.

STRUCTURE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE REPRESSION OF STRUCTURES

Once the position now indicated has been reached, it obviously becomes incumbent upon us to review afresh our theory of the mental apparatus. In particular, it becomes a question how far Freud's description of mental structure in terms of id, ego and super-ego can be retained without modification. The moment this question is raised, it is, of course, plainly in relation to the status of the id that doubts will first arise; for, if it be true that no 'impulses' can be regarded as existing in the absence of an ego structure, it will no longer be possible to preserve any psychological distinction between the id and the ego. Freud's conception of the *origin* of the ego as a structure which develops on the surface of the psyche for the purpose of regulating id-impulses in relation to reality will thus give place to a conception of the ego as the source of impulse-tension from the beginning. This inclusion of the id in the ego will, of course, leave essentially unaffected Freud's conception of the *function* served by the 'ego' in regulating the discharge of impulse-tension in deference to the conditions of outer reality. It will, however, involve the view that 'impulses' are oriented towards reality, and thus to some extent determined by the 'reality principle', from the very beginning. Thus, for example, the child's earliest oral behaviour will be regarded as oriented *ab initio* towards the breast. In accordance with this point of view, the pleasure principle will cease to be regarded as the primary principle of behaviour and will come to be regarded as a subsidiary principle of behaviour involving an impoverishment of object-relationships and coming into operation in proportion as the reality principle fails to operate, whether this be on account of the immaturity of the ego structure or on account of a failure of development on its part. Questions regarding the extent to which the reality principle has superseded the pleasure principle will then give place to questions regarding the extent to which an originally immature reality principle has progressed towards maturity; and questions regarding the capacity of the ego to regulate id-impulses in deference to reality will give place to questions regarding the measure in which the ego structure within which impulse-tension arises has been organized in accordance with the reality principle, or, in default of this, has resorted to the pleasure principle as a means of organization.

If, then, 'impulse' is to be regarded as inseparably associated with an ego structure from the beginning, what becomes of Freud's conception of repression as a function exercised by the ego in its dealings with impulses originating in the id? I have already elsewhere (1943) considered the implications of my theory of object-relationships for the concept of repression. There I advanced the view that repression is primarily exercised, not against impulses which have come to appear painful or 'bad' (as in Freud's final view) or even against painful memories (as in Freud's earlier view), but against *internalized objects* which have come to be treated as bad. I still feel justified in regarding this view as correct; but in certain other respects my views regarding repression have undergone a change. In particular, I have come to regard repression as exercised, not only against internalized objects (which, incidentally, must be regarded as endopsychic structures, albeit not ego structures), but also against parts of the 'ego' which seek relationships with these internal objects. Here it may occur to the reader to pass the criticism that, since repression is a function of the 'ego', this view involves the anomaly of the ego repressing itself. How, it may be asked, can the ego be conceived as repressing the ego? The answer to this question is that, whilst it is inconceivable that the ego as a whole should repress itself, it is not inconceivable that one part of the 'ego' with a dynamic charge should repress another part of the 'ego' with a dynamic charge. This is, of course, quite a different proposition from one set of impulses repressing another set—a conception rightly rejected by Freud when engaged in the task of formulating his theory of the mental apparatus. In order to account for repression Freud found himself compelled to postulate the existence of a *structure* capable of instigating repression—viz. the super-ego. It is, therefore, only another step in the same direction to postulate the existence of structures which are repressed. Apart from any theoretical reasons such as those already advanced, there are very good clinical reasons for making such an assumption. Prominent among these is the difficulty experienced in effecting the sublimation of libidinal 'impulses'. This difficulty cannot be adequately explained as due to an inveterate and inherent obstinacy on the part of 'impulses' themselves, especially once we have come to regard 'impulses' as just forms of energy at the disposal of the ego structure. On the contrary, it can only be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the repressed 'impulses' are inseparable from an ego structure with a definite pattern. The correctness of this assumption is confirmed by the phenomena of multiple personality, in which the linkage of repressed 'impulses' with a submerged ego structure is beyond question; but such a linkage may also be detected in the less extensive

forms of dissociation, which are so characteristic of the hysterical individual. In order to account for repression, we thus appear to be driven to the necessity of assuming a certain multiplicity of egos. This should not really prove a particularly difficult conception for any one familiar with the problems presented by schizoid patients. But here, as so often, we are reminded of the limitations imposed upon psycho-analytical theory in some of its later developments by a preoccupation with the phenomena of melancholia.

THE SCHIZOID POSITION

That Freud's theory of mental structure is itself based in no small measure upon a consideration of the phenomena of melancholia can hardly escape the notice of any reader of *The Ego and the Id* (1923), the work which contains the classic exposition of the theory; and, in conformity with this fact, it is in his paper entitled 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917) that we find the final link in the chain of thought which culminated in the exposition in question. Correspondingly the 'depressive position' is accorded a place of central importance in the views of Melanie Klein and her collaborators. Here I must confess that the accordance of such a central place to the depressive position is difficult to reconcile with my own experience. It would be idle, of course, to deny the importance of the depressive position in individuals suffering from true depression or, for that matter, in individuals of a depressive type. So far as my experience goes, however, such individuals do not constitute any appreciable proportion of the analyst's clientèle, although, of course, they are common enough in ordinary psychiatric practice. So far as concerns the usual run of patients suffering from anxiety states, psychoneurotic symptoms and character difficulties, the central position seems to me to be schizoid rather than depressive in the vast majority of those who embark upon and persist in analytical treatment; and it is not very often that I find a patient under analysis displaying what I should regard as an incontrovertibly depressive (i.e. melancholic) reaction. By contrast I find schizoid reactions relatively common.

At this point I feel it necessary to refer to the distinction which I have already drawn (1941) between the characteristically melancholic affect of 'depression' and the 'sense of futility' which I have come to regard as the characteristically schizoid affect. From the point of view of the observer there is, admittedly, sufficient superficial similarity between the two affects to render the distinction difficult to draw in many cases, especially since the schizoid individual so commonly describes himself as 'depressed'; and consequently the familiar term 'depressed' is frequently applied in clinical practice to patients who should properly be described as suffering from a sense of futility. In this way a confusion of classification is liable to occur, with the result that a number of patients with psychoneurotic symptoms come to be regarded as belonging to the depressive type when the type to which they belong is really schizoid. Apart from this source of confusion, however, it is a common thing for a basic schizoid position to escape notice in the case of 'psychoneurotic' patients owing to the strength of psychoneurotic defences and the resulting prominence of psychoneurotic (e.g. hysterical) symptoms in the clinical picture. Yet, when we consider the cases cited by Janet in illustration of the material upon the basis of which he formulated the conception of hysteria as a clinical entity, it is difficult to avoid concluding that quite a number of the individuals concerned displayed remarkably schizoid characteristics; and indeed it may be surmised that an appreciable proportion would actually be diagnosed as frank schizophrenics if they appeared in a modern psychiatric clinic. Here it may be added that my own investigations of patients with hysterical symptoms leave me in no doubt whatever that the dissociation phenomena of 'hysteria' involve a split of the ego fundamentally identical with that which confers upon the term 'schizoid' its etymological significance.

'BACK TO HYSTERIA'

At this point it seems apposite to recall that Freud's earliest researches within the realm of psychopathology were concerned almost exclusively with hysterical (and *not* with melancholic) phenomena, and that it is upon a basis of these phenomena, accordingly, that psycho-analytical theory and practice were originally founded. It would doubtless be idle to speculate to what extent the development of psycho-analytical theory would have pursued a different course if hysterical phenomena had retained the central place which they originally occupied in Freud's researches; but it may at least be surmised that the importance subsequently assumed by the depressive position would have been assumed in large measure by the schizoid position. It was, of course, when Freud turned from the study of the repressed to a study of the agency of repression that the problems of melancholia began to oust problems of hysteria from the central position which the latter had hitherto occupied. That this should have been the case is not difficult to understand in view of (a) the close association which appears to exist between guilt and repression, on the one hand, and (b) the outstanding prominence which guilt assumes in the melancholic state, on the other. Be that as it may, Freud's theory of the super-ego certainly represents an attempt to trace the genesis of guilt and the instigation of repression to a common source in the Oedipus situation. This fact gives rise to a serious incompatibility between Freud's views regarding the origin of repression and Abraham's 'phase'

² I should add that, in my opinion, it is always 'bad' objects that are internalized in the first instance, since it is difficult to find any adequate motive for the internalization of objects which are satisfying and 'good'. Thus it would be a pointless procedure on the part of the infant to internalize the breast of a mother with whom he already had a perfect relationship in the absence of such internalization, and whose milk proved sufficient to satisfy his incorporative needs. According to this line of thought it is only in so far as his mother's breast fails to satisfy his physical and emotional needs and thus becomes a bad object that it becomes necessary for the infant to internalize it. It is only later that good objects are internalized to defend the child's ego against bad objects which have been internalized already; and the super-ego is a 'good object' of this nature.

theory of libidinal development; for, whilst Freud conceived the Oedipus situation, to which he looked for the rationale of repression, as essentially a genital situation, his account of the origin of the super-ego, which he regarded as the instigator of repression, is conceived in terms of an oral situation, i.e. a situation corresponding to a stage which, according to the 'phase' theory, must necessarily be pregenital. Melanie Klein has, of course, come to regard the Oedipus situation as originating at a very much earlier stage than was formerly supposed. Her resolution of the difficulty must accordingly be interpreted as having been achieved at the expense of the 'phase' theory. This theory has already been the subject of detailed criticism on my part (1941). At the same time I have now come to look for the source of repression not only beyond the genital attitude, but also beyond the Oedipus situation, and even beyond the level at which the super-ego is established. Thus I not only attempted elsewhere (1943) to show that *repression* originates primarily as a defence against 'bad' internalized objects (and not against impulses, whether incestuous in the genital sense or otherwise), but also that *guilt* originates as an *additional* defence against situations involving bad internalized objects. According to this view, guilt originates on the principle that the child finds it more tolerable to regard himself as conditionally (i.e. morally) bad than to regard his parents as unconditionally (i.e. libidinally) bad. To describe the process whereby the change from the latter to the former attitude is effected, I introduced the term 'moral defence'; and, according to my view, it is only at the instance of the 'moral defence' that the super-ego is established.² The establishment of the super-ego accordingly represents the attainment of a new level of structural organization, beneath which the old level persists. Thus, in my opinion, beneath the level at which the central ego finds itself confronted with the super-ego as an internal object of moral significance lies a level at which parts of the ego find themselves confronted with internal objects which are, not simply devoid of moral significance, but unconditionally bad from a libidinal standpoint (amoral internal persecutors of one kind or another). Whilst, therefore, the main phenomenon of melancholia may be regarded as receiving a relatively satisfactory explanation at the super-ego level, some of the accompanying phenomena are not so easily explained. Thus the paranoid and hypochondriacal trends which so frequently manifest themselves in melancholics represent an orientation towards internal objects which are in no sense 'good', but are unconditionally (i.e. libidinally) bad. The same may be said of the obsessional features which are so characteristic of individuals in the initial stages of depression; for the obsessional defence is not primarily moral. On the contrary, this defence is essentially a defence against the 'unlucky', i.e. against situations involving relationships with unconditionally bad (internal) objects. It is equally difficult to find a satisfactory explanation of the symptoms of 'hysteria' at the super-ego level—if for no other reason than that in 'hysteria' the libidinal inhibitions which occur are out of all proportion to the measure of guilt which is found to be present. Since, therefore, it was in an effort on Freud's part to explain hysterical phenomena that psycho-analysis originated, it may not be without profit to return to a consideration of this material, encouraging ourselves, if encouragement be needed, with the slogan 'Back to hysteria'.

A MULTIPLICITY OF EGOS

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that, whereas the repressed was eventually described by Freud as consisting essentially of impulses, he found it necessary to fall back upon structural conceptions (the ego and the super-ego) when he came to seek an explanation of the agency of repression. Reduced to its simplest terms, Freud's conception of repression is to the following effect:—(a) that the agency of repression is the ego, (b) that repression is instigated and maintained by the pressure of the super-ego (an internalized parental figure) upon the ego, (c) that the repressed consists essentially in libidinal impulses, and (d) that repression arises as a means of defence against impulses involved in the Oedipus situation and treated by the ego as 'guilty' in terms of the pressure of the super-ego. That the agent and the instigator of repression should both be regarded as structures whilst the repressed is regarded as consisting of impulses involves a certain anomaly which appears so far to have escaped attention. The extent of this anomaly may perhaps best be appreciated in the light of the fact that the super-ego, which is described as the instigator of repression, is itself largely unconscious; for this raises the difficult question whether the super-ego itself is not also repressed. Freud himself was by no means oblivious to this problem; and he expressly envisages the possibility of the super-ego being in some measure subject to repression. Repression of the super-ego would, of course, represent the repression of a structure. It would thus appear

that the general possibility of the repression of a structure is recognized by Freud; and, in the light of the considerations already advanced, it becomes reasonable to ask whether the repressed is not invariably and inherently structural. In this event the anomaly to which I have referred would be avoided.

That the repressed is essentially structural in nature is implicit in the view which I have already advanced (1943) to the effect that repression is primarily directed against internalized objects which are treated as bad; for, unless it is assumed that internalized objects are structures, the conception of the existence of such objects becomes utterly meaningless. In the light of further experience, my view that repression is primarily directed against bad internalized objects has proved to require considerable elaboration in a direction which has eventually led me to a revised conception of psychical structure. What actually provided the occasion of my chief step in this direction was the analysis of a dream recorded by one of my patients. This patient was a married woman who originally came to me for analysis on account of frigidity. Her frigidity was unquestionably a phenomenon of hysterical dissociation (hysterical anæsthesia combined with hysterical paresis of the vagina); but, like all such phenomena, it represented but one part of a general personality problem. The dream itself was simple enough; but it struck me in the light of one of those simple manifestations which have so often in the history of science been found to embody fundamental truths.

The (manifest) dream to which I refer consisted in a brief scene in which the dreamer saw the figure of herself being viciously attacked by a well-known actress in a venerable building which had belonged to her family for generations. Her husband was looking on; but he seemed quite helpless and quite incapable of protecting her. After delivering the attack the actress turned away and resumed playing a stage part, which, as seemed to be implied, she had momentarily set aside in order to deliver the attack by way of interlude. The dreamer then found herself gazing at the figure of herself lying bleeding on the floor; but, as she gazed, she noticed that this figure turned for an instant into that of a man. Thereafter the figure alternated between herself and this man until eventually she awoke in a state of acute anxiety.

It came as no great surprise to me to learn from the dreamer's associations that the man into whom the figure of herself turned was wearing a suit closely resembling one which her husband had recently acquired, and that, whilst he had acquired this suit at her instigation, he had taken 'one of his blondes' to the fitting. This fact, taken in conjunction with the fact that in the dream he was a helpless spectator of the attack, at once confirmed a natural suspicion that the attack was directed no less against him than against herself. This suspicion was amply confirmed by further associations which need not be detailed. The course followed by the associations also confirmed an additional suspicion that the actress who delivered the attack belonged as much to the personality of the dreamer as did the figure of herself against which the attack was delivered. In actual fact, the figure of an actress was well suited to represent a certain aspect of herself; for she was essentially a shut-in and withdrawn personality who displayed very little genuine feeling towards others, but who had perfected the technique of presenting façades to a point at which these assumed a remarkably genuine appearance and achieved for her a remarkable popularity. Such libidinal affect as she experienced had, since childhood, manifested itself predominantly in a secret phantasy life of masochistic complexion; but in the life of outer reality she had largely devoted herself to the playing of rôles—e.g. the rôles of good wife, good mother, good hostess and good business woman. From this fact the helplessness attributed to her husband in the dream derived additional significance; for, although she played the rôle of good wife with conspicuous success, her real personality was quite inaccessible to him and the good wife whom he knew was for the most part only the good actress. This held true not only within the sphere of emotional relationships, but also within the sphere of marital relations; for, whilst she remained frigid during intercourse, she had acquired the capacity of conveying the impression of sexual excitement and sexual satisfaction. Further, as the analysis revealed beyond all question, her frigidity represented not only an attack upon the libidinal component in herself, but also a hostile attitude towards her husband as a libidinal object. It is clear, therefore, that a measure of hidden aggression against her husband was involved in her assumption of the rôle of actress as this was portrayed in the dream. It is equally clear from the dream that, in a libidinal capacity, she was identified with her husband as the object of her own aggression. At this point, it should be mentioned that, when the dream occurred, her husband was a member of one of the combatant Services and was about to return home on leave. On the eve of his return, and just before the occurrence of the dream, she had developed a sore throat. This was a conjunction of events which had occurred so frequently in the past as to preclude coincidence on this occasion, and which accordingly served to confirm her identification with her husband as the object of her aggression. The situation represented in the dream is thus one in which the dreamer in one capacity, so far unspecified, vents her aggression directly against herself in another capacity, viz., a libidinal capacity, whilst, at the same time,

venting her aggression indirectly against her husband as a libidinal object. At a superficial level, of course, this situation readily lent itself to being interpreted in the sense that the dreamer, being ambivalent towards her husband, had diverted the aggressive component in her ambivalent attitude from her husband to herself at the instance of guilt over her aggression in conformity with the melancholic pattern. Nevertheless, during the actual session in which the dream was recorded this interpretation did not commend itself to me as exhaustive, even at a superficial level.

It is obvious, of course, that the situation represented in the dream lent itself to a deeper interpretation than that to which reference has just been made. The situation was described a moment ago as one in which the dreamer in a capacity so far unspecified vented her aggression directly against herself in a libidinal capacity, whilst, at the same time, venting her aggression indirectly against her husband as a libidinal object. This description is, of course, incomplete in that it leaves unspecified the capacity in which she expressed her aggression; and it is when we come to consider the nature of this unspecified capacity that the deeper significance of the dream becomes a matter of moment. According to the manifest content of the dream, it was as an actress that she delivered the attack; and we have already seen how well suited the figure of an actress was to represent an aspect of herself hostile to libidinal relationships. However, abundant material had already emerged during the analysis to make it plain that the figure of an actress was at least equally well suited to represent the dreamer's mother—an artificial woman who had neither displayed any natural and spontaneous affection towards her children nor welcomed any such display on their part towards herself, and for whom the fashionable world provided a stage upon which she had spent her life in playing parts. It was thus easy to see that, in the capacity of actress, the dreamer was closely identified with her mother as a repressive figure. The introduction of her mother into the drama as an apparently 'super-ego' figure at once raises the question whether the deeper interpretation of the dream should not be couched in terms of the Oedipus situation; and it becomes natural to ask whether her father is not also represented. In reality her father had been killed on active service during the war of 1914–18, at a time when she was only six years of age; and analysis had revealed the presence of considerable resentment towards him as a libidinal object who had proved at once exciting and rejecting (this resentment being focussed particularly upon the memory of an early dressing-room scene). If then we are to look for a representation of her father in the dream, our choice is obviously limited to a single figure—the man who alternated with the figure of the dreamer as the object of attack. We have seen, of course, that this figure represented her husband; but analysis had already revealed how closely her husband was identified by transference with her father. For this, as well as for other reasons which need not be detailed, it was safe to infer that the man who was involved in the attack represented her father at the deeper level of interpretation. At this level, accordingly, the dream was capable of being interpreted as a phantasy in which both she and her father were portrayed as being killed by her mother on account of a guilty incestuous relationship. At the same time the dream was equally capable of being interpreted in terms of psychical structure, and thus as representing the repression of her libido on account of its incestuous attachment to her father at the instigation of a super-ego modelled upon her mother. Nevertheless, neither of these interpretations seemed to me to do justice to the material, although the structural interpretation seemed to offer the more fruitful line of approach.

At this point I feel it necessary to make some reference to the development of my own views regarding phantasy in general and dreams in particular. Many years ago I had the opportunity to analyse a most unusual woman whom, in retrospect, I now recognize to have been a schizoid personality, and who was a most prolific dreamer. Among the dreams recorded by this woman were a number which defied all efforts to bring them into conformity with the 'wish-fulfilment' theory, and which she herself came to describe quite spontaneously as 'state of affairs' dreams, intending by this description to imply that they represented actually existing endopsychic situations. Doubtless this made an impression on me. At any rate, much later, after Freud's theory of psychical structure had become familiar, after Melanie Klein had elaborated the conceptions of psychical reality and internal objects and after I myself had become impressed by the prevalence and importance of schizoid phenomena, I tentatively formulated the view that all the figures appearing in dreams represented either parts of the dreamer's own personality (conceived in terms of ego, super-ego and id) or else identifications on the part of the ego. A further development of this view was to the effect that dreams are essentially, not wish-fulfilments, but snapshots, or rather 'shorts' (in the cinematographic sense), of situations existing in inner reality. To the view that dreams are essentially 'shorts' of situations existing in inner reality I still adhere in conformity with the general line of thought pursued in this article; but, so far as the figures appearing in dreams are concerned, I have now modified my view to the effect that such figures represent either parts of the 'ego' or internalized objects. According to my present view, therefore, the situations depicted in dreams represent relationships existing between endopsychic structures; and the same

applies to situations depicted in waking phantasies. This conclusion is the natural outcome of my theory of object-relationships taken in conjunction with a realization of the inescapable fact that internalized objects must be regarded as endopsychic structures if any theoretic significance whatever is to be attached to them.

After this explanatory digression I must return to the specific dream under discussion with a view to giving some account of the conclusions which I subsequently reached, in no small measure as the result of an attempt to solve the theoretic problems which it raised in my mind. As I have already stated, none of the obvious interpretations seemed to me entirely satisfactory, although the structural type of interpretation seemed to offer the most fruitful line of approach. The reader will, of course, bear in mind what I have already said regarding psychical structures; and he will also recall my having already formulated the view that all psychopathological developments originate at a stage antecedent to that at which the super-ego develops and proceed from a level beneath that at which the super-ego operates. Thus no reference will be made in what follows either to the super-ego or to the id as explanatory concepts. On the contrary, whilst adopting a structural approach, I shall attempt to elucidate the significance of the dream quite simply in terms of the data which it itself provides.

In the manifest dream the actual drama involves four figures:—(1) the figure of the dreamer subjected to attack, (2) the man into whom this figure turns, and who then alternates with it, (3) the attacking actress, and (4) the dreamer's husband as a helpless onlooker. In our preoccupation with the actual drama, however, we must not forget our only witness of its occurrence—the dreamer herself, the observing ego. Including her, there are five figures to be reckoned with. At this juncture I venture to suggest that, if the dream had ended a few seconds earlier, there would only have been four figures, even on the assumption that the 'I' of the dream is taken into account; for it was only in the fifth act, so to speak, that a man began to alternate with the figure of the dreamer as the object of attack. This is an interesting reflection; for we must conclude that, up to the point of the emergence of this man, the object of attack was a composite figure. The special interest of this phenomenon resides in the fact that, as we have seen, there is good reason to regard a second figure as composite; for the attacking actress undoubtedly represented both another figure of the dreamer and the dreamer's mother. I venture, therefore, to hazard a further suggestion—that, if the dream had lasted a few seconds longer, there might well have been six figures, instead of five. It is safe, at any rate, to infer that there were six figures in the latent content; and this, after all, is what matters for purposes of interpretation. Assuming then that six figures are represented in the dream, let us proceed to consider the nature of these figures. When we do so, our first observation is that the figures fall into two classes—ego structures and object structures. Interestingly enough there are three members of each class. The ego structures are (1) the observing ego or 'I', (2) the attacked ego, and (3) the attacking ego. The object structures are (1) the dreamer's husband as an observing object, (2) the attacked object, and (3) the attacking object. This leads us to make a second observation—that the ego structures naturally lend themselves to be paired off with the object structures. There are three such pairs:—(1) the observing ego and the dreamer's husband, who also figured as an observer; (2) the attacking ego and the attacking object representing her mother, and (3) the attacked ego and the attacked object representing her father (for at this point it is to the deeper level of interpretation that we must adhere).

Bearing these two main observations in mind, let us now consider the conclusions to which I was led in an attempt to interpret the dream to my satisfaction. They are as follows. The three ego figures which appear as separate in the dream actually represent separate ego structures in the dreamer's mind. The dreamer's 'ego' is therefore split in conformity with the schizoid position; and it is split into three separate egos—a central ego and two other subsidiary egos which are both, relatively speaking, cut off from the central ego. Of these two subsidiary egos, one is the object of aggression on the part of the other. Since the ego which is attacked is closely related to the dreamer's father (and by transference to her husband), it is safe to infer that this ego is highly endowed with libido; and it may thus be appropriately described as a 'libidinal ego'. Since the attacking ego is closely related to the dreamer's mother as a repressive figure, its behaviour is quite in accord with that traditionally ascribed to the super-ego in the setting of the Oedipus situation. Since, however, the attack bears all the marks of being vindictive, rather than moral, and gives rise to an affect, not of guilt, but of plain anxiety, there is no justification (apart from preconceptions) for equating the attacking ego with the super-ego. In any case, as I have already indicated, there is reason to attach overriding psychopathological importance to a level beneath that at which the super-ego functions. At the same time, it was shown by the circumstances in which the dream occurred that the dreamer's libidinal relationship with her husband was severely compromised; and, so far as the dream is concerned, it is clearly to the operation of the attacking ego that we must look for the compromising factor. Consequently, the attacking ego may perhaps be most appropriately described as an 'internal saboteur'. In an

attempt to discover what this dream was stating and to determine the structural significance of what was stated, I was accordingly led to set aside the traditional classification of mental structure in terms of ego, id and super-ego in favour of a classification couched in terms of an ego-structure split into three separate egos—(1) a central ego (the 'I'), (2) a libidinal ego, and (3) an aggressive, persecutory ego which I designate as the internal saboteur. Subsequent experience has led me to regard this classification as having a universal application.

THE OBJECT-RELATIONSHIPS OF THE CENTRAL EGO AND THE SUBSIDIARY EGOS

Such being my conclusions regarding the ego structures represented in the dream, let us now pass on to consider my conclusions regarding the object-relationships of these ego structures. As already indicated, each of the three egos in question naturally lends itself to being paired off with a special object. The special object of the central ego was the dreamer's husband; and it is convenient to begin by considering the nature of the attitude adopted by the dreamer's central ego towards him. Since the central ego was the observing 'I' of the dream, who was felt to be continuous with the waking 'I' by whom the dream was subsequently described, it is safe to infer that this ego is in no small measure preconscious—which is, in any case, what one would naturally expect of an ego deserving the title of 'central'. This inference gains further support from the fact that the dreamer's husband was a supremely important object in outer reality and was very much in the dreamer's conscious thoughts on the eve of the dream. Although the figure representing him in the dream must be regarded as an internalized object, this object must obviously occupy a much more superficial position in the psyche than the other objects represented (parental objects internalized in childhood); and it must correspond comparatively closely to the relative object in outer reality. Accordingly, the dreamer's attitude to her husband as an external object assumes considerable significance for our present purpose. This attitude was essentially ambivalent, especially where marital relations were concerned. Active manifestations of aggression towards him were, however, conspicuously absent. Equally, her libidinal attachment to him bore the marks of severe repression; and, in associating to the dream, she reproached herself over her lack of deep feeling towards him and her failure to give to him of herself, albeit her conscious capacity to remedy these deficiencies was restricted to an assumption of the rôle of 'good wife'. The question therefore arises whether, since her hidden aggression towards him and her hidden libidinal need of him do not declare themselves directly in the dream, they may not manifest themselves in some indirect fashion. No sooner is this question raised than we are at once reminded of the metamorphosis undergone by the figure of the libidinal ego after this was attacked by the figure of the internal saboteur. The libidinal ego changed into, and then began alternating with, a man who, whilst representing the dreamer's father at a deep level, was nevertheless closely associated with her husband. It is thus evident that, instead of being directed against her husband as an external object, a considerable proportion of her aggression was absorbed in an attack directed, not simply against the libidinal ego, but also against an internal object closely connected with the libidinal ego. It is likewise evident that this volume of aggression had come to be at the disposal, not of the central ego, but of the internal saboteur. What then of the libidinal component in her ambivalence? As we have seen, her libidinal attitude to her husband showed signs of considerable impoverishment in spite of good intentions at a conscious level. It is obvious, accordingly, that what held true of her aggression also held true of her libido. A considerable proportion had ceased to be at the disposal of the central ego. The object towards whom this volume of libido is directed can hardly remain in doubt. In terms of the dream, it must surely be the man who alternated with the libidinal self as the object of aggression. Unlike the aggression, however, this libido is not at the disposal of the internal saboteur. On the contrary we must regard it as being at the disposal of the libidinal ego; and indeed it is precisely for this reason that the term 'libidinal ego' has come to commend itself to me for adoption. At this point it becomes desirable to formulate a suspicion which must be already present in the mind of the reader—that, although it is represented otherwise in the dream, the attack delivered by the internal saboteur is only secondarily directed against the libidinal ego and is primarily directed against the libidinal object which alternates with this ego. Assuming this suspicion to be correct, we must regard the ordeal to which the libidinal ego is subjected as evidence of a very complete identification with, and therefore a very strong libidinal attachment to, the attacked object on the part of the libidinal ego. It is evidence of the measure of 'suffering' which the libidinal ego is prepared to endure out of devotion to its object. The anxiety experienced by the dreamer on waking may be interpreted in a similar sense; and indeed I venture to suggest that this anxiety represented an irruption into consciousness of such 'suffering' on the part of the libidinal ego. Here we are at once reminded of Freud's original conception of neurotic anxiety as libido converted into suffering. This is a view which at one time presented the greatest theoretic difficulty to me, but which I have now come to appreciate in the light of my present standpoint, and substantially to accept in preference to the


modified view which Freud later (and, as I think, rather reluctantly) came to adopt.

The position regarding the object-relationships of the three egos represented in the dream has now been to some extent clarified; but the process of clarification is not yet complete. Up to date, the position which has emerged would appear to be as follows. The dreamer's preconscious attitude towards her husband is ambivalent; and this is the attitude adopted by her central ego towards its external object, as well as towards the internalized representative of this object. However, both the libidinal and the aggressive components in the object-relationship of the central ego are predominantly passive. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the dreamer's active libido is at the disposal of the libidinal self and is directed towards an internalized object which, for purposes of nomenclature, may perhaps best be described as 'the (internal) needed object'. At the same time, a considerable proportion of her aggression is at the disposal of the internal saboteur and is directed (a) towards the libidinal self, and (b) towards the needed object (i.e. towards the object of the libidinal self). It cannot fail to be noticed, however, that this summary of the position leaves out of account certain endopsychic relationships which may be presumed to exist—notably (1) the relationship of the central ego to the other egos, and (2) the relationship of the internal saboteur to the internalized object with which it is so closely associated, and which is represented by the maternal component in the actress figure. Taking the latter relationship first, we have no difficulty in seeing that, since the actress in the dream was a composite figure representing both the dreamer's mother and herself, the internal saboteur is closely identified with its object and must therefore be regarded as bound to this object by a strong libidinal attachment. For purposes of description we must give the object a name; and I propose to describe it as 'the (internal) rejecting object'. I have chosen this term primarily for a reason which will emerge later; but meanwhile my justification will be that the dreamer's mother, who provided the original model of this internalized object, was essentially a rejecting figure, and that it is, so to speak, in the name of this object that the aggression of the internal saboteur is directed against the libidinal self. As regards the relationship of the central ego to the other egos, our most important clue to its nature lies in the fact that, whereas the central ego must be regarded as comprising preconscious and conscious, as well as unconscious, elements, the other egos must equally be regarded as essentially unconscious. From this we may infer that the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur are both rejected by the central ego; and this inference is confirmed by the fact that, as we have seen, the considerable volume of libido and of aggression which has ceased to be at the disposal of the central ego is now at the disposal of the subsidiary egos. Assuming then that the subsidiary egos are rejected by the central ego, it becomes a question of the dynamic of this rejection. Obviously the dynamic of rejection cannot be libido. So there is no alternative but to regard it as aggression. Aggression must, accordingly, be regarded as the characteristic determinant of the attitude of the central ego towards the subsidiary egos.

I have now completed the account of my attempt to reconstruct, in terms of dynamic structure, the endopsychic situation represented in a patient's dream. The account has been cast in the form of a reasoned statement; and, as such, it should serve to give some indication of what is involved in my view that dreams are essentially 'shorts' of inner reality (rather than wish-fulfilments). However, it is not primarily with the aim of substantiating my views on dreams in general that I have claimed so much of the reader's attention for a single dream. On the contrary, it is because the dream in question seems to me to represent an endopsychic situation of a classic order, and indeed of a basic character which entitles it to be regarded as the paradigm of all endopsychic situations. For convenience, the general features of this situation are illustrated in the accompanying diagram.

Figure 1

CE, Central Ego; IS, Internal Saboteur; LE, Libidinal Ego; RO, Rejecting Object; NO, Needed Object.
Cs, Conscious; Pcs, Preconscious; Ucs, Unconscious. ®, Aggression; =, Libido.



THE BASIC ENDOPSYCHIC SITUATION AND A REVISED THEORY OF MENTAL STRUCTURE FOUNDED THEREON

I myself feel convinced that the basic endopsychic situation above described is the situation underlying Freud's description of the mental apparatus in terms of ego, id, and super-ego. It is certainly the endopsychic situation upon which I deliberately base the revised theory of mental structure which I now submit, and which is couched in terms of central ego, libidinal ego and internal saboteur. As it would, of course, be natural to expect, there is a general correspondence between Freud's concepts and those which I have

³ Freud's conception of the ego was, of course, borrowed from Groddeck; but, if there is any truth in the conclusions which will shortly be recorded, it is a conception based upon an endopsychic situation resulting from repression, and therefore is anomalous in terms of Freud's own views, since it implies that repression is responsible for the origin of the ego.

now come to adopt. In the case of 'the central ego' the correspondence to Freud's 'ego' is fairly close from a functional standpoint; but there are important differences between the two concepts. Unlike Freud's 'ego', the 'central ego' is not conceived as originating out of something else (the 'id'), or as constituting a passive structure dependent for its activity upon impulses proceeding from the matrix out of which it originated, and on the surface of which it rests.³ On the contrary, the 'central ego' is conceived as a primary and dynamic structure, from which, as we shall shortly see, the other mental structures are subsequently derived. The 'libidinal ego' corresponds, of course, to Freud's 'id'; but, whereas according to Freud's view the 'ego' is a derivative of the 'id', according to my view the 'libidinal ego' (which corresponds to the 'id') is a derivative of the 'central ego' (which corresponds to the 'ego'). The 'libidinal ego' also differs from the 'id' in that it is conceived, not as a mere reservoir of instinctive impulses, but as a dynamic structure comparable to the 'central ego', although differing from the latter in various respects, e.g. in its more infantile character, in a lesser degree of organization, in a smaller measure of adaptation to reality and in a greater devotion to internalized objects. The 'internal saboteur' differs from the 'super-ego' in a number of respects. For one thing it is in no sense conceived as an internal object. It is wholly an ego structure, although, as we have seen, it is very closely associated with an internal object. Actually, the 'super-ego' corresponds not so much to the 'internal saboteur' as to a compound of this structure and its associated object (like the figure of the actress in the dream). At the same time, the 'internal saboteur' is unlike the 'super-ego' in that it is conceived as, in itself, devoid of all moral significance. Thus I do not attribute the affect of guilt to its activity, although this activity is unquestionably a prolific source of anxiety. Such anxiety may, of course, merge with guilt; but the two affects are theoretically distinct. Here it should be noted that, whilst introducing the conception of the internal saboteur, I am not prepared to abandon the conception of the super-ego as I have now come to abandon that of the id. On the contrary, it seems to me impossible to offer any satisfactory psychological explanation of guilt in the absence of the super-ego; but the super-ego must be regarded as originating at a higher level of mental organization than that at which the internal saboteur operates. Exactly how the activities of the two structures are related must in the meantime remain an open question; but for the most recent expression of my views regarding the origin and the function of the super-ego I must refer the reader to another article (1943).

SPLITTING OF THE EGO AND REPRESSION CONSIDERED AS ASPECTS OF AN IDENTICAL PROCESS OPERATIVE IN BOTH SCHIZOID AND HYSTERICAL CONDITIONS

Before proceeding to consider the origin of what I have called 'the basic endopsychic situation', I feel it necessary to record some general conclusions which seem to follow from the inherent nature of the situation itself. The first and most obvious of these conclusions is that the ego is split. In this respect, therefore, the basic endopsychic situation which has now emerged conforms to the pattern of the schizoid position—a position which, as already indicated, I have come to regard as central (in preference to the depressive position). Freud's theory of the mental apparatus was, of course, developed upon a basis of the depressive position; and it is on a similar basis that Melanie Klein has developed her views. By contrast, it is the schizoid position that constitutes the basis of the theory of mental structure which I now advance. It is to be noted, further, that, whilst conforming to the pattern of the schizoid position, the endopsychic situation revealed in my patient's dream also provided a satisfactory explanation of the dreamer's hysterical frigidity in terms of dynamic structure. Here we are reminded of the common association of hysterical symptoms with an underlying schizoid attitude—an association to which reference has already been made. There would, accordingly, appear to be good grounds for our second conclusion—that hysterical developments are inherently based upon an underlying and fundamental schizoid position. Our third conclusion follows from what has already been said regarding the aggressive attitude of the central ego towards the subsidiary egos. It is to the effect that the splitting of the ego observed in the schizoid position is due to the operation of a certain volume of aggression which remains at the disposal of the central ego. It is this aggression that provides the dynamic of the severance of the subsidiary egos from the central ego. The subsidiary egos are, of course, ordinarily unconscious; and their unconscious status at once raises the suspicion that they are subject to repression. This is obviously so in the case of the libidinal ego (which corresponds to Freud's id); but, if one of the subsidiary ego structures can be repressed, there is no reason for regarding the other as immune from similar treatment at the hands of the central ego. Consequently our fourth conclusion is that the internal saboteur (which largely corresponds to Freud's super-ego in function) is repressed no less than the libidinal ego. This conclusion may at

first sight appear to be in conflict with the theory which I previously advanced (1943), to the effect that repression is primarily directed against bad internalized objects. There is no real inconsistency, however; for I regard the repression of the subsidiary egos, which I now envisage, as secondary to the repression of bad internalized objects. Here we find a helpful analogy in the attack of the internal saboteur on the libidinal ego; for, as we have seen, the aggression involved in this attack is primarily directed against the needed object to which the libidinal ego is related, and only secondarily against the libidinal ego itself. Similarly, I regard repression of the libidinal ego on the part of the central ego as secondary to repression of the needed object. Our fifth conclusion needs no elaboration in the light of what precedes. It is to the effect that the dynamic of repression is aggression. Our sixth, and last, conclusion, which follows equally from preceding conclusions, is that splitting of the ego, on the one hand, and repression of the subsidiary egos by the central ego, on the other, constitute essentially the same phenomenon considered from different points of view. Here it is apposite to recall that, whilst the concept of splitting of the ego was formulated by Bleuler in an attempt to explain the phenomena of what was known as 'dementia præcox' until he introduced the term 'schizophrenia' to take its place, the concept of repression was formulated by Freud in an attempt to explain the phenomena of hysteria. Our final conclusion thus serves to substantiate the view that the position underlying the development of hysterical symptoms is essentially a schizoid position.

THE ORIGIN OF THE BASIC ENDOPSYCHIC SITUATION AND OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF EGOS

It is now time for us to turn our attention to questions regarding the origin of the basic endopsychic situation which found a classic expression in my patient's dream. In the light of considerations which have already emerged, it will be obvious that whatever explanation we may reach regarding the origin of this situation will also serve as an explanation of the origin of the schizoid position, the origin of repression and the differentiation of the various fundamental endopsychic structures. As we have seen, the patient whose dream has occupied so much of our attention was essentially ambivalent towards her husband as an external object; and it is from the establishment of a state of ambivalence towards external objects in early life that the basic endopsychic situation springs. The first libidinal object of the infant is, of course, his mother's breast, although there can be no doubt that the form of his mother as a person soon begins to take shape round the original nucleus of this maternal organ. Under theoretically perfect conditions the libidinal relationship of the infant to his mother would be so satisfactory that a state of libidinal frustration could hardly arise; and, as I see it, there would consequently be no ambivalence on the part of the infant towards his object. At this point I must explain that, whilst I regard aggression as a primary dynamic factor in that it does not appear capable of being resolved into libido (as Jung, for example, sought to resolve it), at the same time I regard it as ultimately subordinate to libido, not only metaphysically, but also psychologically. Thus I do not consider that the infant directs aggression spontaneously towards his libidinal object in the absence of frustration; and my observation of the behaviour of animals confirms me in this view. It should be added that in a state of nature the infant would never normally experience that separation from his mother which appears to be imposed upon him increasingly by conditions of civilization. Indeed, it may be inferred that in a state of nature it would be rare for the infant to be deprived of the shelter of his mother's arms and of ready access to her breast until, in the ordinary course of development, he himself became increasingly disposed to dispense with them.⁴ Such perfect conditions are, however, only theoretically possible for the human infant born into a cultural group; and in actual fact the libidinal relationship of the infant to his mother is disturbed from the first by a considerable measure of frustration, although, of course, the degree of such frustration varies in different cases. It is the experience of libidinal frustration that calls forth the infant's aggression in relation to his libidinal object and thus gives rise to a state of ambivalence. To content ourselves with saying simply that the infant becomes ambivalent would, however, be to give an incomplete and partial picture of the situation which now arises; for it would be a picture conceived exclusively from the point of view of the observer. From the point of view of the infant himself it is a case of his mother becoming an ambivalent object, i.e. an object which is both good and bad. Since it proves intolerable to him to have a good object which is also bad, he seeks to alleviate the situation by splitting the figure of his mother into two objects. Then, in so far as she satisfies him libidinally, she is a good object, and, in so far as she fails to satisfy him libidinally, she is a bad object. The situation in which he now finds himself placed proves, however, in its turn to be one which imposes a severe strain upon his capacity for endurance and his power of adjustment. Being

⁴ It must be recognized, of course, that, under any conditions, a profound sense of separation and loss of security must be experienced by the infant at the time of birth; and it may be presumed that some measure of aggression, in addition to anxiety, is called forth by this experience. There is no reason, however, to think that this experience in itself would give rise to a state of ambivalence in the absence of further experience of libidinal frustration during infancy.

a situation in outer reality, it is one which he finds himself impotent to control, and which, accordingly, he seeks to mitigate by such means as are at his disposal. The means at his disposal are limited; and the technique which he adopts is more or less dictated by this limitation. He accordingly follows the only path open to him and, since outer reality seems unyielding, he does his best to transfer the traumatic factor in the situation to the field of inner reality, within which he feels situations to be more under his own control. This means that he internalizes his mother as a bad object. Here I would remind the reader that, in my opinion, it is always the bad object (i.e., at this stage, the unsatisfying object) that is internalized in the first instance; for (as already indicated in a footnote) I find it difficult to attach any meaning to the primary internalization of a good object which is both satisfying and amenable from the infant's point of view. There are those, of course, who would argue that it would be natural for the infant, when in a state of deprivation, to internalize the good object on the wish-fulfilment principle; but, as it seems to me, internalization of objects is essentially a measure of coercion and it is not the satisfying object, but the unsatisfying object that the infant seeks to coerce. I speak here of 'the satisfying object' and 'the unsatisfying object', rather than of 'the good object' and 'the bad object', because I consider that, in this connection, the terms 'good object' and 'bad object' tend to be misleading. They tend to be misleading because they are liable to be understood in the sense of 'desired object' and 'undesired object' respectively. There can be no doubt, however, that a bad object may be desired. Indeed it is just because the infant's bad object is desired as well as felt to be bad that it is internalized. The trouble is that it remains bad after it has been internalized, i.e. it remains unsatisfying. At this point an important consideration arises. Unlike the satisfying object, the unsatisfying object has, so to speak, two facets. On the one hand, it frustrates; and, on the other hand, it tempts and allures. Indeed its essential 'badness' consists precisely in the fact that it combines allurements with frustration. Further, it retains both these qualities after internalization. After internalizing the unsatisfying object, accordingly, the infant finds himself in the quandary of 'out of the frying-pan into the fire'. In his attempts to control the unsatisfying object, he has introduced into the inner economy of his mind an object which not only continues to frustrate his need, but also continues to whet it. He thus finds himself confronted with another intolerable situation—this time an internal one. How does he seek to deal with it? As we have seen, in his attempt to deal with the intolerable external situation with which he was originally faced his technique was to split the maternal object into two objects, (a) the 'good' and (b) the 'bad', and then proceed to internalize the bad object; and in his attempt to deal with the intolerable internal situation which subsequently arises he adopts a technique which is not altogether dissimilar. He splits the bad internal object into two objects—(a) the tempting or needed object and (b) the frustrating object; and then he represses both these objects (employing aggression, of course, as the dynamic of repression). Here a complication arises, however; for his libidinal attachment to the undivided object is shared, albeit not in equal proportions, by the objects resulting from division. The consequence is that, in the process of repressing the resultant objects, the ego, so to speak, develops pseudopodia by means of which it still maintains libidinal attachments to the objects undergoing repression. The development of these pseudopodia represents the initial stage of a division of the ego. As repression of the objects proceeds, the incipient division of the ego becomes an accomplished fact. The two pseudopodia are rejected by the part of the ego which remains central on account of their connection with the rejected objects; and with their associated objects they share the fate of repression. It is in this way that the two subsidiary egos, the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur, come to be split off from the central ego, and that a multiplicity of egos arises.

THE *DIVIDE ET IMPERA* TECHNIQUE FOR THE DISPOSAL OF LIBIDO AND AGGRESSION

It will be noted that the situation resulting from the sequence of processes which has just been described has now assumed the *structural* pattern of what I have called 'the basic endopsychic situation'. It has also assumed the *dynamic* pattern of this situation except in one important respect—that the aggressive attitude adopted by the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego and its associated object (the needed object) is still left out of the picture. In order to explain the origin of this feature of the situation, we must return to the original ambivalence of the child towards his mother and consider from a fresh angle what this involves. This time we shall consider the child's reactions, less in their conative, and more in their affective aspect. It is natural for the child, not only to be impulsive, but also to express his feelings in no uncertain terms. Moreover, it is through the expression of his feelings that he makes his chief impression upon his objects. Once ambivalence has been established, however, the expression of feeling towards his mother involves him in a position which must seem to him singularly precarious. Here it must be pointed out that what presents itself to him from a strictly conative standpoint as *frustration* at the hands of his mother presents itself to him in a very different light from a strictly affective standpoint. From the latter standpoint, what he experiences is a sense of lack of love, and indeed emotional *rejection*

on his mother's part. This being so, the expression of hate towards her as a rejecting object becomes in his eyes a very dangerous procedure. On the one hand, it is calculated to make her reject him all the more, and thus to increase her 'badness' and make her seem *more real* in her capacity of bad object. On the other hand, it is calculated to make her love him less, and thus to decrease her 'goodness' and make her seem *less real* (i.e. destroy her) in her capacity of good object. At the same time, it also becomes a dangerous procedure for the child to express his libidinal need, i.e. his nascent love, of his mother in face of rejection at her hands; for it is equivalent to discharging his libido into an emotional vacuum. Such a discharge is accompanied by an affective experience which is singularly devastating. In the older child this experience is one of intense humiliation over the depreciation of his love, which seems to be involved. At a somewhat deeper level (or at an earlier stage) the experience is one of shame over the display of needs which are disregarded or belittled. In virtue of these experiences of humiliation and shame he feels reduced to a state of worthlessness, destitution or beggary. His sense of his own value is threatened; and he feels bad in the sense of 'inferior'. The intensity of these experiences is, of course, proportionate to the intensity of his need; and intensity of need itself increases his sense of badness by contributing to it the quality of 'demanding too much'. At the same time his sense of badness is further complicated by the sense of utter impotence which he also experiences. At a still deeper level (or at a still earlier stage) the child's experience is one of, so to speak, exploding ineffectively and being completely emptied of libido. It is thus an experience of disintegration and of imminent psychical death.

We can understand accordingly how precarious a matter it becomes for the child, when confronted with the experience of rejection by his mother, to express either aggressive or libidinal affect towards her. Reduced to its simplest terms, the position in which he finds himself placed would appear to be one in which, if, on the one hand, he expresses aggression, he is threatened with loss of his good object, and, if, on the other hand, he expresses libidinal need, he is threatened with the loss of his libido (which for him constitutes his own goodness) and ultimately with loss of the ego structure which constitutes himself. Of these two threats by which the child feels menaced, the former (i.e. loss of the good object) would appear to be that which gives rise to the affect of depression, and which provides a basis for the subsequent development of a melancholic state in individuals for whom the disposal of aggression presents greater difficulties than the disposal of libido. On the other hand, the latter threat (i.e. loss of libido and of ego structure) would appear to be that which gives rise to the affect of futility, and which provides a basis for the subsequent development of a schizoid state in individuals for whom the disposal of libido presents greater difficulties than the disposal of aggression.

So far as the aetiology of depressive and schizoid states is concerned, views similar to those just indicated have already been developed by me at some length previously (1941). In the present instance, however, our immediate concern is with the measures adopted by the child to circumvent the various dangers which appear to him to attend the expression of affect, whether libidinal or aggressive, towards his mother when he is faced with the experience of rejection at her hands. As we have already seen, he attempts to deal with the ambivalent situation successively (1) by splitting the figure of his mother into two objects, a good and a bad, (2) by internalizing the bad object in an endeavour to control it, (3) by splitting the bad internalized object in turn into two objects, viz. (a) the tempting or needed object, and (b) the rejecting object, (4) by repressing both these objects and employing a certain volume of his aggression in the process, and (5) by employing a further volume of his aggression in splitting off from his central ego and repressing two subsidiary egos which remain attached to these respective internalized objects by libidinal ties. These various measures, based upon the techniques of internalization and splitting, serve to mitigate the asperities of the situation resulting from the child's experience of frustration in his relationship with his mother and his sense of rejection at her hands; but, except in the most extreme cases, they do not succeed in eliminating the child's need of his mother as an object in outer reality, or in robbing her of all significance—which, after all, is just as well. In conformity with this fact, his libido and his aggression are very far from being wholly absorbed in the processes so far described; and, consequently, the risks involved in the expression of libidinal and aggressive affect towards his mother as a rejecting object still remain to be met. The measures so far described thus require to be supplemented. Actually they are supplemented by a very obvious technique which is closely akin to the well-known principle of '*Divide et impera*'. The child seeks to circumvent the dangers of expressing both libidinal and aggressive affect towards his object by using a maximum of his aggression to subdue a maximum of his libidinal need. In this way he reduces the volume of affect, both libidinal and aggressive, demanding outward expression. As has already been pointed out, of course, neither libido nor aggression can be considered as existing in a state of divorce from structure. Accordingly, what remains for us to decide is to which of the ego structures already described the child's excess of libido and excess of aggression are to be respectively allotted. This is a question to which the answer can be in no doubt. The excess of libido is taken over by the libidinal

ego; and the excess of aggression is taken over by the internal saboteur. The child's technique of using aggression to subdue libidinal need thus resolves itself into an attack by the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego. The libidinal ego in its turn directs the excess of libido with which it becomes charged towards its associated object, the needed object. On the other hand, the attack of the internal saboteur upon this object represents a persistence of the child's original resentment towards his mother as a temptress inciting the very need which she fails to satisfy and thus reducing him to bondage—just as, indeed, the attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego represents a persistence of the hatred which the child comes to feel towards himself for the dependence dictated by his need. It should be added that the processes just described take place simultaneously with those which they are designed to supplement, although, in the interests of clarity of exposition, they have been described separately.

DIRECT REPRESSION, LIBIDINAL RESISTANCE AND INDIRECT REPRESSION

Now that the origin of the aggressive attitude adopted by the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego and the needed object has been described, our account of the processes which determine the dynamic pattern of the basic endopsychic situation is complete. At this point, however, something requires to be added to what has already been said regarding the nature and origin of repression. In terms of the line of thought so far developed, repression is a process originating in a rejection of both the needed object and the rejecting object on the part of the undivided ego. This primary process of repression is accompanied by a secondary process of repression whereby the ego splits off and rejects two parts of itself, which remain attached respectively to one and the other of the repressed internal objects. The resulting situation is one in which the central ego (the residue of the undivided ego) adopts an attitude of rejection, not only towards the needed object and the rejecting object, but also towards the split off and subsidiary egos attached to these respective objects, i.e. the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur. This attitude of rejection adopted by the central ego constitutes repression; and the dynamic of the rejection is aggression. So far so good. But this explanation of the nature and origin of repression is incomplete in so far as it has not yet taken into account what is involved in the technique of reducing the volume of libido and aggression available for expression towards external objects by employing a maximum of aggression to subdue a maximum of libido. As we have seen, this technique resolves itself into a process whereby (a) the excess of aggression is taken over by the internal saboteur and devoted to an attack upon the libidinal ego, and (b) the excess of libido is taken over by the libidinal ego and directed towards the needed object. When the full significance of this process is considered, it becomes at once plain that the relentless attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego must operate as a very powerful factor in furthering the aims of repression. Indeed, so far as dynamic is concerned, it seems more than likely that this is the most important factor in the maintenance of repression. Obviously it is upon the phenomenon just mentioned that Freud's conception of the super-ego and its repressive functions is based; for the uncompromising hostility which, according to Freud, characterizes the attitude of the super-ego towards id impulses coincides exactly with the uncompromisingly aggressive attitude adopted by the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego. Similarly, Freud's observation that the self-reproaches of the melancholic are ultimately reproaches directed against the loved object falls readily into line with the aggressive attitude adopted towards the needed object by the internal saboteur.

There is no need at this point to repeat the criticisms already passed upon Freud's conceptions of the super-ego and the id, and upon all that is involved in these conceptions. It does, however, seem desirable to draw attention to the fact that, in his description of repression, Freud left completely out of account all that is involved in the phenomenon which I have described as the attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object. As we have seen, this attachment comes to absorb a considerable volume of libido. Further, the volume of libido in question is directed towards an object which is both internal and repressed; and, in conformity with this fact, it is inevitably oriented away from outer reality. Such being the case, the object-seeking of the libidinal ego operates as a resistance which powerfully reinforces the resistance directly resulting from repression, and which is thus no less in conflict with therapeutic aims than is the latter resistance. This is a theme which I have already developed, *mutatis mutandis*, elsewhere (1943). I add the proviso '*mutatis mutandis*' here, because, at the time when I wrote the article referred to, I had not yet formulated my present views regarding endopsychic structures; but the effect of these latter views is to give greater point, rather than otherwise, to the original theme. This theme is, of course, in direct conflict with Freud's statement (1920), (19): 'The unconscious, i.e. the "repressed" material, offers no resistance whatever to curative efforts.' It is, however, a theme which develops naturally out of the view that libido is primarily object-seeking, once we come to consider what happens when the object sought is a repressed internal object; and, in terms of my present standpoint, there can be no room for doubt that the obstinate attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object and its reluctance to renounce this object constitute a

particularly formidable source of resistance—and one which plays no small part in determining what is known as the negative therapeutic reaction. The attachment in question, being libidinal in character, cannot, of course, be regarded as in itself a repressive phenomenon; but, whilst itself a resultant of repression exercised by the central ego, it also functions as a powerful aid to this process of repression. The attack of the internal saboteur upon the object of the libidinal ego (the needed object) serves, of course, to perpetuate the attachment of the libidinal ego to its object by virtue of the fact that this object is being constantly threatened. Here we catch a glimpse of the original wolf under its sheep's clothing, i.e. we catch a glimpse of the original ambivalent situation persisting underneath all its disguises; for what the obstinate attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object and the equally obstinate aggression of the internal saboteur towards the same object really represent is the obstinacy of the original ambivalent attitude. The truth is that, however well the fact may be disguised, the individual is extremely reluctant to abandon his original hate, no less than his original need, of his original objects in childhood. This holds particularly true of psychoneurotic and psychotic individuals, not to mention those who fall into the category of psychopathic personality.

If the attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object serves as a powerful aid to repression, the same may equally be said of the aggressive attitude adopted towards this internal object by the internal saboteur. So far as the actual process **if** repression is concerned, however, the latter differs from the former in one important respect; for not only does it forward the aim of repression, but it also actually operates in the same manner as repression. In its attack upon the needed object it performs a function which constitutes it a cobelligerent, albeit not an ally, of the central ego, whose repression of the needed object represents, as we have seen, a manifestation of aggression. The internal saboteur functions further as a cobelligerent of the central ego in respect of its attack upon the libidinal ego—an attack which serves to supplement that involved in the repression of this ego by the central ego. There is a sense, therefore, in which it would be true to say that the attacks of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego and upon its associated object represent an *indirect form of repression*, whereby the direct repression of these structures by the central ego is both supplemented and facilitated.

As we have already seen, the subsidiary egos owe their origin to a split of the undivided ego: but, as we have also seen, what presents itself from a topographic standpoint as simply a split of the ego presents itself from a dynamic standpoint as an active rejection and repression of both the subsidiary egos on the part of the central ego. It thus becomes a matter for some comment that, whilst both the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur share a common fate so far as direct repression is concerned, only one of the subsidiary egos, viz. the libidinal ego, should be subjected to the process of indirect repression. When the difference between direct and indirect repression is considered in the light of what has already been said, it is, of course, plain that the process of repression described by Freud corresponds very much more closely to what I have described as indirect repression than to what I have described as direct repression. Nevertheless, when Freud's conception of repression is compared with my conception of the total phenomenon of repression, both direct and indirect, this common feature may be detected—that the libidinal components in the psyche are subjected to a much greater measure of repression than the aggressive components. There can be no doubt, of course, that the repression of aggressive components does occur: but it is difficult to see how this fact can be consistently explained in terms of Freud's theory of the mental apparatus. This theory, conceived as it is in terms of a fundamental divorce between impulse and structure, would appear to permit only of the repression of libido: for, in terms of Freud's theory, the repression of aggression would involve the anomaly of aggression being used to repress aggression. By contrast, if, in conformity with the point of view which I advocate, we conceive of impulse as inseparable from structure and as representing simply the dynamic aspect of structure, the repression of aggressive components in the psyche is no more difficult to account for than the repression of libidinal components. It then becomes a question, not of aggression repressing aggression, but of one ego structure using aggression to repress another ego structure charged with aggression. This being so, my view to the effect that the internal saboteur, no less than the libidinal ego, is repressed by the central ego provides a satisfactory explanation of the repression of aggressive components. At the same time, the fact that libidinal components are subject to a greater measure of repression than aggressive components is satisfactorily explained by means of the conception of indirect repression. The truth would appear to be that, if *the principle of repression* governs the disposal of *excess libido* in greater measure than it governs the disposal of excess aggression, *the principle of topographical redistribution* governs the disposal of *excess aggression* in greater measure than it governs the disposal of excess libido.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OedipUS SITUATION

I have already said enough to indicate that the technique whereby aggression is employed to subdue libido is a process which finds a common place in Freud's conception of 'repression' and my

own conception of 'indirect repression'. At the same time, my views regarding the origin of this technique differ from those of Freud. According to Freud, the technique originates as a means of averting the expression of libidinal (incestuous) impulses towards one parent and aggressive (parenticidal) impulses towards the other parent in the setting of the Oedipus situation. According to my view, on the other hand, the technique originates in infancy as a means of averting the expression of both libido and aggression on the part of the infant towards his mother, who at this stage constitutes his only significant object, and upon whom he is wholly dependent. This discrepancy of views will be interpreted, quite correctly, in the sense that I have departed from Freud in my evaluation of the Oedipus situation as an explanatory concept. For Freud, the Oedipus situation is, so to speak, an ultimate cause; but this is a view with which I no longer find it possible to agree. So far from agreeing, I now consider that the rôle of ultimate cause, which Freud allotted to the Oedipus situation, should properly be allotted to the phenomenon of infantile dependence. In conformity with this standpoint, the Oedipus situation presents itself, not so much in the light of a causal phenomenon as in the light of an end-product. It is not a basic situation, but the derivative of a situation which has priority over it not only in the logical, but also in the temporal sense. This prior situation is one which issues directly out of the physical and emotional dependence of the infant upon his mother, and which declares itself in the relationship of the infant to his mother long before his father becomes a significant object. The present is no occasion for an elaboration of the views which I have now reached regarding the Oedipus situation—views which have been in some measure adumbrated already (1941). Nevertheless, in view of the comparison which I have just drawn between my own conception of repression and Freud's conception, formulated as it is in terms of the Oedipus situation, it seems desirable that I should indicate briefly how I propose to introduce this classic situation into the general scheme which I have outlined. It will hardly be necessary to remind the reader that I have dispensed with the Oedipus situation as an explanatory concept not only in my account of the origin of repression, but also in my account of the genesis of the basic endopsychic situation and in my account of the differentiation of endopsychic structure. These accounts have been formulated exclusively in terms of the measures adopted by the child in an attempt to cope with the difficulties inherent in the ambivalent situation which develops during his infancy in his relationship with his mother as his original object. The various measures which the child adopts in his attempt to deal with this ambivalent situation have all been adopted before the Oedipus situation develops. It is in the setting of the child's relationship to his mother that the basic endopsychic situation is established, that the differentiation of endopsychic structure is accomplished and that repression is originated; and it is only after these developments have occurred that the child is called upon to meet the particular difficulties which attend the Oedipus situation. So far from furnishing an explanatory concept, therefore, the Oedipus situation is rather a phenomenon to be explained in terms of an endopsychic situation which has already developed.

The chief novelty introduced into the child's world by the Oedipus situation, as this materializes in outer reality, is that he is now confronted with two distinct parental objects instead of with only one as formerly. His relationship with his new object, viz. his father, is, of course, inevitably fraught with vicissitudes similar to those which he previously experienced in his relationship with his mother—and, in particular, the vicissitudes of need, frustration and rejection. In view of these vicissitudes, his father becomes an ambivalent object to him, whilst at the same time he himself becomes ambivalent towards his father. In his relationship with his father he is thus faced with the same problem of adjustment as that with which he was originally faced in his relationship with his mother. The original situation is reinstated, albeit this time in relation to a fresh object; and, very naturally, he seeks to meet the difficulties of the reinstated situation by means of the same series of techniques which he learned to adopt in meeting the difficulties of the original situation. He splits the figure of his father into a good and a bad object, internalizes the bad object and splits the internalized bad object into (*a*) a needed object associated with the libidinal ego and (*b*) a rejecting object associated with the internal saboteur. It should be added that the new paternal needed object would appear to be partly superimposed upon, and partly fused with the old maternal needed object, and that similarly the paternal rejecting object is partly superimposed upon, and partly fused with the maternal rejecting object.

The adjustment which the child is called upon to make in relation to his father differs, of course, in one important respect from that which he was previously called upon to make in relation to his mother. It differs in the extent to which it has to be achieved upon an emotional plane. The new adjustment must be almost exclusively emotional; for in his relationship with his father the child is necessarily precluded from the experience of feeding at the breast. We are thus introduced to a further important respect in which his adjustment to his father must differ from his previous adjustment to his mother. His father is a man, whereas his mother is a woman. It is more than doubtful, however, whether the child at first appreciates the genital difference between the two parents. It would appear rather that the difference

which he does appreciate is that his father has no breasts. His father thus first presents himself to the child as a parent without breasts; and this is one of the chief reasons that his relationship with his father has to be established so much more on an emotional plane than his relationship with his mother. On the other hand, it is because the child does have the experience of a physical relationship with his mother's breast, while also experiencing a varying degree of frustration in this relationship, that his need for his mother persists so obstinately beneath his need for his father and all subsequent genital needs. When the child comes to appreciate, in some measure at least, the genital difference between his parents, and as, in the course of his own development, his physical need tends to flow increasingly (albeit in varying degrees) through genital channels, his need for his mother comes to include a need for her vagina. At the same time, his need for his father comes to include a need for his father's penis. The strength of these physical needs for his parents' genitals varies, however, in inverse proportion to the satisfaction of his emotional needs. Thus, the more satisfactory his emotional relations with his parents, the less urgent are his physical needs for their genitals. These latter needs are, of course, never satisfied, although substitutive satisfactions may be sought, e.g. those of sexual curiosity. Consequently, some measure of ambivalence necessarily develops in relation to his mother's vagina and his father's penis. This ambivalence is reflected, incidentally, in sadistic conceptions of the primal scene. By the time the primal scene is envisaged, however, the relationships of his parents to one another have become a matter of moment for the child; and jealousy of each of his parents in relation to the other begins to assert itself. The chief incidence of his jealousy is, of course, partly determined by the biological sex of the child; but it is also in no small measure determined by the state of his emotional relationships with his respective parents. Be this as it may, the child is now called upon to meet the difficulties of two ambivalent situations at the same time; and he seeks to meet these difficulties by the familiar series of techniques. The result is that he internalizes both a bad maternal genital figure and a bad paternal genital figure and splits each of these into two figures, which are embodied respectively in the structures of the needed object and the rejecting object. It will thus be seen that, before the child is very old, these internal objects have already assumed the form of complex composite structures. They are built up partly on a basis of the superimposition of one object upon another, and partly on a basis of the fusion of objects. The extent to which the internal objects are built up respectively on a basis of layering and on a basis of fusion differs, of course, from individual to individual; and the extent to which either layering or fusion predominates would appear to be a matter of no small importance. Thus, in conjunction with the proportioning of the various component objects, it would appear to play an important part in determining the psycho-sexual attitude of the individual in so far as this is not determined by biological sexual factors. Likewise, in conjunction with the proportioning of the component objects, it would appear to be the chief determining factor in the aetiology of the sexual perversions. We may thus envisage an aetiology of the perversions conceived in terms of object-relationship psychology.

It will be noticed that in the preceding account the personal pronoun employed to indicate the child has been consistently masculine. This must not be taken to imply that the account applies only to the boy. It applies equally to the girl; and the masculine pronoun has been used only because the advantages of a personal pronoun of some kind appear to outweigh those of the impersonal pronoun, however non-committal this may be. It will also be noticed that the classic Oedipus situation has not yet emerged. The stage which was last described was one at which, whilst the relations of his parents with one another had become significant to the child, his position was essentially one of ambivalence towards both parents. We have seen, however, that the child seeks to deal with both ambivalent situations by a series of processes in consequence of which genital figures of each of his parents come to be embodied both in the structure of the needed object and in that of the rejecting object. It must be recognized, of course, that the biological sex of the child must play some part in determining his attitude to his respective parents; but that this is very far from being the sole determining factor is obvious from the frequency of inverted and mixed Oedipus situations. Considered in terms of the views which I have outlined, these inverted and mixed Oedipus situations must necessarily be determined by the constitution of the needed object and the rejecting object. It is, therefore, only taking a further step in the same direction to conclude that the same consideration applies to the positive Oedipus situation. The fact then would appear to be that *the Oedipus situation is not really an external situation at all, but an internal situation*—one which may be transferred in varying degrees to the actual external situation. Once the Oedipus situation comes to be regarded as essentially an internal situation, it is not difficult to see that the maternal components of both the internal objects have, so to speak, a great initial advantage over the paternal components; and this, of course, applies to children of both sexes. The strong position of the maternal components is, of course, due to the fact that the nuclei of both the internal objects are derivatives of the original ambivalent mother and her ambivalent breasts. In conformity with this fact, *of sufficiently deep analysis of the Oedipus situation*

invariably reveals that this situation is built up around the figures of an internal needed mother and an internal rejecting mother. It was, of course, on a basis of hysterical phenomena that Freud originally formulated the concept of the Oedipus situation; and according to Abraham's 'phase' theory the origin of hysteria is to be traced to a fixation in the genital (phallic) phase. I have already (1941) passed various criticisms on Abraham's 'phase' theory; and so I shall be merely passing a further criticism, if only by implication, when I say that I have yet to analyse the hysteric, male or female, who does not turn out to be an inveterate breast-seeker at heart. I venture to suggest that the deep analysis of a positive Oedipus situation may be regarded as taking place at three main levels. At the first level the picture is dominated by the Oedipus situation itself. At the next level it is dominated by ambivalence towards the heterosexual parent; and at the deepest level it is dominated by ambivalence towards the mother. Traces of all these stages may be detected in the classic drama of *Hamlet*; but there can be no doubt that, both in the rôle of needed and tempting object and in that of rejecting object, the Queen is the real villain of the piece. The position then would appear to be this. The child finds it intolerable enough to be called upon to deal with a single ambivalent object; but, when he is called upon to deal with two, he finds it still more intolerable. He, therefore, seeks to simplify a complex situation, in which he finds himself confronted with two needed objects and two rejecting objects, by converting it into one in which he will only be confronted with a single needed object and a single rejecting object; and he achieves this aim, with, of course, a varying measure of success, by concentrating upon the needed aspect of one parent and the rejecting aspect of the other. He thus, for all practical purposes, comes to equate one parental object with the needed object, and the other with the rejecting object; and by so doing *the child constitutes the Oedipus situation for himself*. Ambivalence to both parents persists, however, in the background; and at rock bottom both the needed object and the rejecting object remain what they originally were, viz. figures of his mother.

NEUROTIC ANXIETY AND HYSTERICAL SUFFERING

I have spoken of the *divide et impera* technique as a means of reducing the volume of affect (both libidinal and aggressive) which demands outward expression; and at this point it would be both relevant and profitable to consider in some detail what happens when the attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego fails to subdue libidinal need sufficiently to meet the requirements of the central ego, i.e. sufficiently to reduce the volume of available libidinal affect to manageable proportions. It is impossible, however, to embark upon so large a theme on the present occasion. Suffice it to say that, when the technique in question does not succeed in reducing the volume of libidinal affect sufficiently and so fails to fulfil its primary function, it appears to assume a secondary function, in virtue of which it imposes a change of quality upon such libidinal affect as insists upon emerging and thereby disguises the quality of the original affect. Thus, when the dynamic tension within the libidinal ego rises above a certain threshold value and an excess of libidinal need threatens to assert itself, the emergent libidinal affect is converted into (neurotic) *anxiety* by the impact of the aggression which is directed against the libidinal ego by the internal saboteur. When the dynamic tension within the libidinal ego continues to rise until it reaches a further threshold value, it becomes no longer possible for a libidinal discharge to be averted; and the attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego then has the effect of imparting a *painful* quality to the libidinal affect accompanying the inevitable discharge. Such, at any rate, would appear to be the process involved in the hysterical mode of expressing affect—a process which demands that the expression of libidinal need shall be experienced as suffering.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DYNAMIC STRUCTURE AND ITS GENERAL SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND

In the light of what has just been said regarding the genesis of (neurotic) anxiety, it will be noted that my conception of the nature of anxiety is closely in accord with Freud's original conception, viz. that anxiety is a converted form of undischarged libido. Here we find but one example of the somewhat remarkable fact that, if the general standpoint which I have now come to adopt represents a departure from some of Freud's later views, it has had the effect of revivifying some of Freud's earlier views (views which, in some cases, have latterly been in abeyance). The explanation of this general phenomenon would appear to be that, whilst at every point there is a recognizable analogy between my present views and those of Freud, the development of my views follows a path which diverges gradually from that followed by the historical development of Freud's views. This divergence of paths itself admits of only one explanation—a difference in certain basic theoretic principles. The central points of difference are not difficult to localize. They are two in number. In the first place, although Freud's whole system of thought was concerned with object-relationships, he adhered theoretically to the principle that libido is primarily pleasure-seeking, i.e. that it is directionless. By contrast, I adhere to the principle that libido is primarily object-seeking, i.e. that it has direction. For that matter, I regard aggression as having direction also, whereas, by implication at any rate, Freud regards aggression

as, like libido, theoretically directionless. In the second place, Freud regards impulse (i.e. psychical energy) as theoretically distinct from structure, whereas I do not accept this distinction as valid and adhere to the principle of dynamic structure. Of these two central points of difference between Freud's views and those which I have now come to adopt, the latter is the more fundamental; and indeed the former would appear to depend upon the latter. Thus Freud's view that libido is primarily pleasure-seeking follows directly from his divorce of energy from structure; for, once energy is divorced from structure, the only psychical change which can be envisaged as other than disturbing, i.e. as pleasant, is one which makes for the establishment of an equilibrium of forces, i.e. a directionless change. By contrast, if we conceive of energy as inseparable from structure, then the only changes which are intelligible are changes in structural relationships and in relationships between structures; and such changes are essentially directional.

No man, even the greatest and most original, can remain wholly independent of the scientific background of his day; and it cannot be claimed that even Freud provides an exception to this rule. Here we must remind ourselves of the scientific atmosphere of the nineteenth century in which Freud was nurtured. This atmosphere was dominated by the Helmholtzian conception that the physical universe consisted in a conglomeration of inert, immutable and indivisible particles to which motion was imparted by a fixed quantity of energy separate from the particles themselves. The energy in question was conceived as having been, for some unknown reason, unevenly distributed at the beginning and as subsequently undergoing a gradual process of redistribution calculated to lead eventually to an equilibrium of forces and an immobilization of the solid particles. Such being the prevailing conception of the contemporary physicist, it is not difficult to understand how it came about that, when Freud, in advance of his time, set himself the arduous task of introducing order into the hitherto confused realm of psychopathology, he should have remained sufficiently under the influence of the scientific atmosphere of his day to conceive impulse (psychical energy) as separate from structure and to cast his libido theory in an equilibrium-seeking mould. In my opinion, however, this feature constitutes a limitation imposed by outside influences upon his thought, which otherwise represented an historic advance upon prevailing conceptions in the psychological field, and which was much more in the spirit of the new scientific outlook at present emerging; for during the twentieth century the scientific conception of the physical universe has already undergone a profound change. The inert and indivisible particles or atoms, of which the physical universe was formerly thought to be composed, are now known to be structures of the greatest complexity embodying almost incredible quantities of energy—energy in the absence of which the structures themselves would be unintelligible, but which is equally difficult to explain in the absence of the structures. This intra-atomic energy has effects which not only determine intra-atomic relationships, but also influence bodies at enormous distances. The most remarkable of these effects is radiation; and it has been found necessary to call in radiation to explain certain of the phenomena of light, which defied explanation on the basis of the wave theory of the previous scientific epoch. Interestingly enough, radiation has proved to possess at least one of the properties formerly regarded as a prerogative of solid matter, viz. mass; and the occurrence of radiation affects the structure of both the emitting and the receiving atoms. Further, the universe itself is conceived as undergoing a process of change other than that involved in the establishment of an equilibrium within a closed system. Thus it would appear that the universe is expanding at a terrific speed. The major forces at work are attraction and repulsion (cf. libido and aggression); but, although attraction has the effect of producing local condensations of matter, the dominant force, at any rate during the present phase, is repulsion. So far from being in process of establishing a non-directional equilibrium, therefore, the universe is in process of expanding towards a limit at which no further expansion will be possible and everything will be so attenuated that no further mutual influences will occur and nothing more will be able to happen. The change which the universe is undergoing is thus a directional change. Such being the general scientific background of the present day, it seems to me a demand of the times, if nothing else, that our psychological ideas should be reformulated in terms of a relationship psychology conceived on a basis of dynamic structure.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DYNAMIC STRUCTURE AS AN EXPLANATORY SYSTEM

As an explanatory system, the psychology of dynamic structure which I envisage seems to me to have many advantages, among which by no means the least is that it provides a more satisfactory basis than does any other type of psychology for the explanation of group phenomena. However, this is a theme which, like certain others touched upon in this article, must be left for another occasion. It remains for me, in my concluding remarks, to say something regarding the advantages which appear to accrue from the particular theory of mental structure which I have advanced in place of Freud's classic theory. It is obvious, of course, that, from a topographic standpoint, Freud's theory only admits of the operation of three factors (id, ego and super-ego) in the production

of the variety of clinical states with which we are familiar. By contrast, my theory admits of the operation of five factors (central ego, libidinal ego, internal saboteur, needed object and rejecting object)—even when the super-ego as I conceive it is left out of account. My theory, accordingly, offers a greater range of aetiological possibilities. In actual practice, the difference between the two theories as regards aetiological possibilities is even greater than at first appears; for, of the three factors envisaged in Freud's theory, only two (the ego and the super-ego) are structures properly speaking—the third (viz. the id) being only a source of energy. The energy proceeding from the id is, of course, conceived by Freud as assuming two forms—libido and aggression. Consequently, Freud's theory admits of the operation of two structural and two dynamic factors in all. Freud's two dynamic factors find a place, of course, in my own theory; but, according to my theory, the number of the structural factors is not two, but five. Thus, with five structural factors and two dynamic factors to conjure with, my theory permits of a much greater range of permutations and combinations than does Freud's theory. Actually, however, the possibilities left open by Freud's theory in the abstract are still further limited by his conception of the function of the super-ego, which he regards not only as characteristically aggressive, but also as characteristically antilibidinal. According to Freud, therefore, the endopsychic drama largely resolves itself into a conflict between the ego in a libidinal capacity and the super-ego in an anti-libidinal capacity. The original dualism inherent in Freud's earliest views regarding repression thus remains substantially unaffected by his subsequent theory of mental structure. Such a conception of the endopsychic drama is unduly limiting, not only so far as its implications for social psychology are concerned (e.g. the implication that social institutions are primarily repressive), but also so far as concerns its explanatory value within the psychopathological and characterological fields. Within these fields explanation reduces itself to an account of the attitudes adopted by the ego in a libidinal capacity *vis-à-vis* the super-ego. By contrast, my theory possesses all the features of an explanatory system enabling psychopathological and characterological phenomena of all kinds to be described in terms of the patterns assumed by a complex of relationships between a variety of structures. It also possesses the advantage of enabling psychopathological symptoms to be explained directly in terms of structural conformations, and thus of doing justice to the unquestionable fact that, so far from being independent phenomena, symptoms are but expressions of the personality as a whole.

At this juncture it becomes necessary to point out (if indeed it has not already become sufficiently obvious) that the basic endopsychic situation which I have described, and to which I have attached such importance, is by no means conceived as immutable from the economic standpoint. From the topographic standpoint, it must be regarded as relatively immutable, although I conceive it as one of the chief aims of psycho-analytical therapy to introduce some change into its topography by way of territorial adjustment. Thus I conceive it as among the most important functions of psycho-analytical therapy (*a*) to reduce the split of the original ego by restoring to the central ego a maximum of the territories ceded to the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur, and (*b*) to bring the needed object and the rejecting object so far as possible within the sphere of influence of the central ego. The extent to which such changes can be effected appears, however, to be strictly limited. In its economic aspect, by contrast, the basic endopsychic situation is capable of very extensive modification. In conformity with this fact, I conceive it as another of the chief aims of psycho-analytical therapy to reduce to a minimum (*a*) the attachment of the subsidiary egos to their respective associated objects, (*b*) the aggression of the central ego towards the subsidiary egos and their objects, and (*c*) the aggression of the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego and its object. On the other hand, the basic endopsychic situation is undoubtedly capable of considerable modification in a psychopathological direction. As I have already indicated, the economic pattern of the basic endopsychic situation is the pattern which prevails in hysterical states. Of this I have no doubt whatsoever in my own mind. I have, however, come across cases of hysterical individuals who displayed remarkably paranoid traits (even to the point of having been previously diagnosed as paranoid), and who were found, on analysis, to oscillate between paranoid and hysterical attitudes. Such oscillations appeared to be accompanied by changes in the economic pattern of the endopsychic situation—the paranoid phases being characterized by a departure from the economic pattern of what I have called the *basic* endopsychic situation. What economic pattern the endopsychic situation assumes in the paranoid state I do not feel in a position to say; but I do venture to suggest that corresponding to every distinguishable clinical state there is a characteristic pattern of the endopsychic situation. It must be recognized, of course, that various patterns may exist side by side or be superimposed one upon the other. It must also be recognized that patterning of the endopsychic situation may either be rigid or flexible—extreme rigidity and extreme flexibility being alike unfavourable features. At the same time, it must be stressed that the *basic* (and original) endopsychic situation is that which is found in hysterical states. In conformity with this consideration, I take the view that the earliest psychopathological symptoms to

manifest themselves are hysterical in character; and I interpret the screaming fits of the infant in this sense. If I am right in this, Freud showed no mean insight in choosing hysterical phenomena as the material out of which to build the foundations of psycho-analytical theory.

In the light of considerations already advanced it will be understood, of course, that, although the basic endopsychic situation is the situation underlying hysterical states, it is itself the product of a split of the original ego and is, therefore, a schizoid phenomenon. Thus, although the earliest psychopathological *symptoms* are hysterical, the earliest psychopathological *process* is schizoid. Repression itself is a schizoid process; and splitting of the ego is a universal phenomenon, although, of course, the degree of such splitting varies in different individuals. It is not to be inferred, however, that overt schizoid states are the earliest psychopathological states to develop. On the contrary, the earliest of such states are hysterical in nature. An actual schizoid state is a much later development—one which only materializes when the schizoid process is pushed to a point at which a massive repression of affect occurs and even an hysterical expression of affect is thereby precluded. Thus it is only when a massive repression of affect occurs that the individual becomes unduly detached and experiences a pronounced sense of futility. What is involved in the development of schizoid states cannot, however, be discussed further on the present occasion.

THE DYNAMIC QUALITY OF INTERNALIZED OBJECTS

The feature of Freud's theory of the mental apparatus presenting the greatest anomaly is one to which reference has not yet been made. It is this—that the only part of the psyche which he describes in terms at all approximating to those of dynamic structure is the super-ego. The id is, of course, described as a source of energy without structure; and the ego is described as a passive structure without energy except such as invades it from the id. By contrast, the super-ego is described as a structure endowed with a fund of energy. It is true that the energy in question is conceived as being ultimately derived from the id; but this in no way alters the fact that Freud attributes to the super-ego a considerable measure of independent functional activity. So much is this the case that he speaks of the super-ego and the id as diametrically opposed to one another in the aims of their activities, and of the ego as buffeted between these two endopsychic entities. The odd thing about all this is that the super-ego is really only a naturalized alien, as it were, within the realm of the individual mind, an immigrant from outer reality. Its whole significance resides in the fact that it is essentially an internalized object. That the only part of the psyche which Freud treats as a dynamic structure should be an internalized object is, to my mind, an anomaly sufficient in itself to justify my attempt to formulate an alternative theory of psychical structure. It will be observed that, in formulating such an alternative theory, I have so far followed a line opposite to that followed by Freud in that, whereas an internalized object is the only part of the psyche which Freud treats as a dynamic structure, the internalized objects which I envisage are the only parts of the psyche which I have *not* treated as dynamic structures. I have treated the internalized objects simply as *objects* of the dynamic ego structures, i.e. as endopsychic structures which are not themselves dynamic. I have done this deliberately in order to bring into focus the activity of the ego structures which I find it necessary to postulate, and in order to avoid all risk of under-rating the primary importance of this activity; for, after all, it is only through this activity that objects ever come to be internalized. However, in the interests of consistency, I must now draw the logical conclusion of my theory of dynamic structure and acknowledge that, since internal objects are structures, they must necessarily be, in some measure at least, dynamic. In drawing this conclusion and making this acknowledgment, I shall not only be here following the precedent of Freud, but also, it would seem, conforming to the demands of such psychological facts as are revealed, e.g. in dreams and in the phenomena of paranoia. This further step will enhance the explanatory value of my theory of mental structure by introducing additional possibilities into the endopsychic situation by way of permutation and combination. It must be recognized, however, that, in practice, it is very difficult to differentiate between the activity of internalized objects and the activity of the ego structures with which they are associated; and, with a view to avoiding any appearance of demonology, it seems wise to err, if anything, on the side of overweighting the activity of the ego structures rather than otherwise. It remains true, nevertheless, that under certain conditions internalized objects may acquire a dynamic independence which cannot be ignored.

NOTE

ERRATUM:—I take this, the first, opportunity to correct an unfortunate error which crept into my manuscript of 'A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Psychoneuroses', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **22(1941)**, 267, and which remained uncorrected in the proof. The word 'rejection' in the fourth line of p. 267 should read 'retention'. This error is particularly unfortunate since it reverses the sense.

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Article Citation [\[Who Cited This?\]](#)

Fairbairn, W.D. (1944). Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of Object-Relationships. *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 25:70-92